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Abstract 
This article argues that Hannah Arendt’s thought can offer significant insights on political 
judgement for realism in political theory. We identify a realist position which emphasises the 
need to account for how humans judge politically, contra moralist tendencies to limit its 
exercise to rational standards, but which fails to provide a sufficient conception of its 
structure and potential. Limited appeals to political judgement render the realist defence of 
the political elusive, and compromise the endeavour to offer a meaningful alternative to the 
moralist tendency to displace politics. The potential and limitations of realist discussions on 
judgement are made visible in relation to proto-realists Judith Shklar and Isaiah Berlin. In 
seeking to enrich the realist conception of the political, the article introduces the displacement 
critique found in the neglected Arendtian ‘realism’. It also provides the foundations for a 
distinctly realist account of political judgement which, we argue, requires elaboration along 
two dimensions: the social coding of political judgement and the political capacities that help 
judgement build a suitable political sphere. 
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Introduction 
The charge that political theory is detached from the realities of politics is hardly uncommon 
– it is voiced by those more sympathetic to the empirical study of politics, and/or those who 
possess a predominately practical mind-set. Whilst that charge might suggest a failure to 
appreciate how political theory as such could be purposeful (Horton 2010), criticisms of this 
sort – long-standing in the history of political thought1 – have been recently revived and 
loudly rehearsed by proponents of an ‘alternative’ approach to political theorising captured 
by the loose term of ‘political realism’ (Galston 2010). What animates the realist charge 
against ‘political moralism’ (Williams 2002), ‘high-liberalism’ (Galston 2010, Horton 2017), 
‘the ethics first’ or ‘applied ethics’ approach (Geuss 2008, Rossi & Sleat 2014), is a loosely 
shared conviction that political theorising should be sensitive to the distinctiveness and 
grubbiness of politics, the conflicts and idiosyncrasies of human life (Philp 2007). A 
corresponding realist demand entails that political theorists account for the real characteristics 
of political judgement – an injunction which lies at the heart of the kind of politics and of 
political theorising realists wish to safeguard from, and offer as an antidote to, moralism. As 
realist accounts of this human capacity remain suggestive, and largely negative in nature, 
emphasising, for example, that political judgement should not be conceptualised as ideal 
dialogue (Geuss 2009, p.32), the two demands lead to a lacuna in realist thought that prima 
facie undermines a core realist commitment: the endeavour to offer an affirmative, distinctly 
realist alternative to moralism.2 
Though seemingly incompatible (Owens 2008, Sleat 2013), Arendt’s thought and 
political realism share several core anti-moralist commitments. Yet, amidst controversies 
about her idiosyncratic Kantianism, the proto-realist flavours of her thought on judgement 
have remained obscure. While some commentators have deemed Arendt’s thought as 
hindrance to renewed attempts at conceptualising political judgement (Weidenfeld 2013), 
others, notably Albena Azmanova, and Linda Zerilli, have begun the difficult task of 
projecting it onto the context of modern democratic theory. This article suggests, that 
political realists can profit from locating and exploring Arendt’s account within the context of 
contemporary realist thought – a connection neglected by Arendtian and realist scholars.3 
The discussion proceeds as follows. In the first section, we briefly outline the realist 
critique of moralism – specifically, the tendency of contemporary political thought to 
displace pluralism and conflict, and to put forward a form of political theory which dislodges, 
or sanitises the political. In the second section, we turn to realist perspectives on political 
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judgement. In particular, we explore the work of two theorists in which one can find 
emblematic, and largely neglected, attempts at capturing political judgement from a realist 
perspective: Isaiah Berlin and Judith Shklar. In doing so, we unearth the existence of a lacuna 
in the realist approach to political judgement. Berlin’s and Shklar’s thought enriches our 
understanding of the affinity between moralism and judgements’ failure, and echoes the 
contemporary realist emphasis on the need for a more ‘grounded’ account of political 
judgement, but their alternative theories remain ambivalent and opaque raising more 
questions than they answer. In the third section, we highlight Arendt’s critique of moralist 
displacement of politics and her response through reflective judgement. In the final section, 
we move to Azmanova’s and Zerilli’s extension of her judgement as starting points for 
thinking further what a suitable theory of realist political judgement might entail. 
Specifically, we emphasise two dimensions along which Arendtian and realist scholarship 
can together fruitfully enrich their conception of the political: how to conceive of the critical 
potential of political judgement in relation to its socially conditioned character and, how to 
think further the political capacities that help judgement build a distinctly political sphere. 
 
Political Realism and the Displacement of Real Politics 
Given the diverse ways the label “realism” is employed, a certain amount of work seems 
necessary if one is to speak of “a realist philosophical tradition”, or “the realist critique”. The 
“realist critique” and the sense of ‘realism’ intended here, is understood in its more ‘ordinary 
meaning’ (Horton 2017, p.489) – not as a metaphysical account of reality or of nature, or in 
the manner in which the label is utilised in international relations theory4. Nor, does realism 
entail an obsessiveness with facts which might preclude normative theorising in toto. Political 
realism, so understood, constitutes ‘an intellectual moment of resistance to established ways 
of thinking’ (Philp 2012, p.3); it denotes a dissenting countermovement to the moralism 
which descends from Plato and Kant upon most contemporary political thought – a moralism 
often associated with, though not restricted to, the high-liberalism of John Rawls and his heirs 
– which is unified under the general injunction that political philosophising should begin 
from within politics (Galston 2010, Geuss 2008, 2015, Rossi & Sleat 2014). As such, realism 
in political theory is orthogonal to the ideal/non-deal theory debate; it does not merely 
constitute a corrective to the apparent lack of adequate fact-sensitivity which characterises 
much of contemporary political thought, and does not merely invite political theorists ‘to 
undertake a kind of due diligence’ (Sabl & Sagar 2017, p.270), by being more attentive to 
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feasibility constraints – constraints which affect the implementation or realisation of their 
general, abstract theories.  
To be sure, realism resembles ‘a kind of community stew where everyone throws 
something different into the pot’; yet, William Galston emphasises, there is ‘a theme or 
sentiment that unites realists at the threshold – a belief that high liberalism represents a desire 
to evade, displace, or escape from politics’ (Galston 2010, p.386). There are, Sleat (2011, 
p.471) similarly notes, ‘several family resemblances’, common concerns and arguments’ 
which ‘allow us to speak meaningfully of there being a realist countermovement’. Hence, 
whilst it is not our aim to offer a comprehensive review or to resolve the diversity and 
complexity of political realism (if such diversity and complexity can be resolved), we wish to 
begin by offering a sketch of two intertwined and principal objections to the character of 
contemporary political theory that realists typically advance – objections which are broadly 
consistent with Arendt’s thought and which are fuelled by an implicit acknowledgement of 
the importance of attending to the concrete realities of politics and of political judgement. In 
doing so, we put forward a modest, albeit significant, claim: given the realist emphasis on the 
importance of attending to the realities of politics and of political judgement on the one hand, 
and the realist endeavour to offer a meaningful alternative to moralism on the other, realism 
requires first-of-all a more explicit and sustained engagement with political judgement. 
To cut a long story short, realists contend that moralism (including most forms of ideal 
and non-ideal theory), sets off from the wrong premises. At the core of that theory lies the 
conviction that political philosophizing should start from an external, abstract moral 
standpoint – comprehensive, unitary and all-inclusive conceptions of the good and/or justice, 
captured by a set of principles to which rational individuals can ascend. Politics, on this 
account, is thus problematically reduced to the ‘matter of knowing the ethical truth about the 
world’; and ‘to have this knowledge’ requires one ‘to have a grasp of eternal verities, which, 
in order to be understood … need to be first stripped’ of the superficial ‘accidents of 
empirical existence and of history’ (Guess 2015, 4f.). This leads to displacement or 
effacement of the moral messiness of politics in at least two ways. 
First, moralism is said to displace pluralism and conflict at the level of the polis. A 
desire for perfect, permanent closure under the aegis of rational harmony, to ‘get politics right 
once-and-for-all’, displaces politics by underestimating how, even under the most ideal of 
circumstances, agreement on a substantive conception of the good and/or justice should not 
be expected. For, our world is bound to comprise of agents who espouse a plurality of 
different, antagonistic, and irreconcilable substantive principles, values and interests and of 
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different, antagonistic, and irreconcilable conceptions of those principles and values (Berlin 
1990, Geuss 2008, Horton 2010, Sleat 2011, 2013, 2014, Rossi & Sleat 2014). Hence, rather 
than seeking to offer substantive accounts of justice to which rational agents should ascend – 
accounts which distort and displace the radical particularity and peculiarity of politics – 
political realists urge us to attend to questions of political power, legality, stability, and 
expediency. 
Secondly, moralism displaces conflict and pluralism at the level of the individual; it 
shies away from the peculiar demands of politics, the paradoxes inherent in individual 
morality – the recognition that there exists an irreconcilable rift between the qualities and 
standards of excellence one might hope to observe in a morally admirable life and those 
conducive to a virtuous political life (Bellamy 2010, Shklar 1984, Williams 1978). As 
Galston and Philp write: 
[T]he integrity of the good life in which ethics and politics are effortlessly 
linked seems a utopian aspiration ... [P]olitical virtue is not only not rooted in 
the good life, it is in its nature exposed to demands that may compromise some 
of our most cherished commitments (Galston, 2010, p.392, Philp, 2007, p.89, 
p.94). 
By virtue of its erroneous conceptualisation of politics, moralism displaces the difficult 
choices and irresolvable conflicts public agents face – choices and conflicts which are part 
and parcel of politics. 
What animates the realist charge then, is the conviction that moralism is sustained by an 
‘ethics first’ or ‘applied ethics’ approach to politics which is, in fact, apolitical. The realist 
charge is, in part, fuelled by an appreciation of the importance of political judgement – and, 
the corresponding moralist tendency to displace that capacity. The juxtaposition of realism 
and moralism unearths what Azmanova terms the paradox of judgement – a paradox which 
confronts most accounts of moral and political philosophy which aspire to be ‘politically 
realistic’, ‘morally rigorous’, and to ‘enable social criticism’:  
The more we weaken our normative criteria, the more we enhance judgement’s 
political relevance at the expense of critical power; however, the higher we set 
the normative standards, the more we lose our grip on political reality – again 
at the expense of judgments critical power (Azmanova 2012, p.239).  
The moralist solution to the paradoxical nature of judgement, however, constitutes an a 
priori, frozen account of judgement whereby ‘the concept of judging is eliminated and the 
just enjoys a pyrrhic victory – freed from the limitations of the politically particular, it 
6 
becomes politically futile’ (Azmanova 2012, p.120). At best, moralism undermines the 
crucial place which judgement occupies in political life: by virtue of its tendency to supplant 
judgement, pluralism and conflict, moralism cannot grapple with the recognition that 
securing certain distinctively political goods, such as a modicum of order and security amidst 
the conflict-ridden context of politics, is impossible without the exercise of political 
judgement (Levy 2011). At worst, because – as realists emphasise – the moralist vision of 
perfection and harmony is implausible, its practical manifestation bespeaks of the failure of 
political judgement. For instance, to seek to ‘let justice be done, though the heavens fall’ – 
the endeavour to keep one’s hands clean by steadfastly upholding certain abstract rules and 
principles, or the dictates of conscience (whatever these may be) – though morally admirable, 
is not a political virtue. Attitudes of this sort bespeak of ‘innocence’, the lack of experience or 
of ‘informed prudence’ (Philp 2012, p.10); they are symptomatic of one’s endeavour to shut 
one’s eyes to the complexity, peculiarity, and distinctive demands of politics (without 
abolishing these), and might imperil the aforementioned political goods – goods which, for 
realists, a responsible politics should shelter. Whether we agree with this presentation of 
moralism or not, the point here is that, from a realist standpoint, political judgement is 
underdetermined by economic, moral, and legal principles, and is irreducible to other forms 
of judgement or to any other sphere of human activity. 
 
Realist Perspectives on Political Judgement 
In their endeavour to give politics its due, contemporary realists routinely emphasise the 
importance of attending to the realities of political practice, action, and judgement (Galston 
2010, p.391f, Nardin 2017, Philp 2010). Realists’ sensitivity to the context in which 
judgement is exercised aside though, their account of judgement remains underdeveloped. 
For example, Enzo Rossi’s and Matt Sleat’s (2014) review of realist thought captures the 
complexity of judgement but says little on its mechanisms and processes. This is also 
apparent in the few realist works explicitly dedicated to that capacity: Richard Bourke’s and 
Raymond Geuss’s introduction to Political Judgement: Essays for John Dunn and Geuss’s 
contribution to that volume, titled What is political judgement?. Both works reiterate the 
realist charge: they take issue with the moralist tendency to sanitise politics by subsuming 
‘individual cases under explanatory and predictive general laws, or under principles of reason 
and rationality’ (Bourke & Geuss 2009, p.4, p.8), and emphasise that attentiveness to the 
realities of politics entails leaving behind the extra-terrestrial, glassy realm of explicitly 
formulated propositions to establish a new, realist foundation for theorising political 
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judgement. However, they say little on the alternative practice of political judgement that 
they have in mind. 
We articulate the problems that come with this realist attitude to judgement 
through a turn to the works of Berlin and Shklar, which – though identified with the 
recent realist turn – are somewhat neglected by contemporary realists.5 Berlin’s and 
Shklar’s thought, which was, like Arendt’s, influenced by the horrors of the 20th 
century, shows an acute awareness of the connection between moralism, cruelty, and a 
displacement of political judgement, and each ends up with a unique conception of 
political judgement. They show that realists can say more about judgement, and 
indeed that they have something very concrete in mind, but their engagements with 
judgement remained fragmentary and negative still, taking us only so far.6 
Shklar on political judgement in a world of injustice and vices 
Shklar’s comments on political judgement, though scarce, show an acute awareness of its 
importance for her project. In the concluding chapter of Ordinary Vices, for instance, she 
states that her aim is to offer an appropriate account of vices in politics by ‘putting cruelty 
first’, and to ‘review critically the judgments we ordinarily make and the possibilities we 
usually see’ (Shklar 1984, p.226). Shklar (1984, p.234) tries to give human beings, with all 
their imperfections, ‘their due’ and to avoid the moralist temptation of reducing virtues to the 
avoidance of vices tout court. As liberals, she notes, we should abandon ‘certainty and 
agreement as goals worthy of free people’; for, ‘liberalism imposes extraordinary ethical 
difficulties on us: to live with contradictions, unresolvable conflicts, and a balancing between 
public and private imperatives which are neither opposed to nor at one with each other’ 
(Shklar 1984, p.249). 
The Faces of Injustice challenges more directly such a moralist quest for certainty and 
agreement, which lurks in the background of political theorists’ obsessiveness with what 
Shklar (1990, p. 17) terms the normal model of justice: the search for substantive principles 
of justice, which subsequently reduces injustice ‘to a prelude to or rejection and breakdown 
of justice’ and which mistreats it as ‘a surprising abnormality’7. The normal model fails to 
offer ‘a serious understanding of injustice as a personal and political experience’ and has 
‘severe difficulties in coming to terms with victims. It limits itself to matching their situation 
against the rules, which is inadequate as a way of recognizing victims’ (Shklar 1990, p. 17, 
p.37). The voices of the victims of injustice tend to be silenced or not heard and the sense of 
injustice, which possesses a deeply, irreducibly subjective component, tends similarly to be 
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ignored. Far from ‘reducing our cruelties’, Shklar (1990, pp.26 – 27) emphasises, substantive, 
universal ‘rules simply redirect and formalize our ferocity’: ‘when we trust the rules, when 
we tend to become too sure of our competence’ that ‘makes us arrogant, cruel and 
tyrannical’.  
What seems to fuel that rejection, is not an a priori theory of justice, but rather, an 
account of judgement (cf. Salaverria 2014, p.709). Shklar (1990, p.27) rejects the normal 
model of justice by appeal to the recognition that we are too ‘ignorant and too diverse to be 
fit into any single normative scheme. We are strangers to one another and we are too ignorant 
to judge each other’. Our experiences, she notes, are too ‘various and incommunicable’ to 
serve as the foundations for ‘general rules of conduct’, such that any attempt to impose them 
tends to backfire and constitutes a manifestation of the lack of judgement (Shklar 1990, p.26). 
Shklar (1990, p.27) builds on psychological research to emphasise that humans rarely use 
statistical information and make simple calculations of probability when making judgements. 
Being less judgemental, Shklar surmises, is therefore necessary if we are to tether cruelty and 
injustice. Scepticism, for Shklar (1990, p.28), thus gives injustice ‘its due because it 
recognizes that our judgments are made in the dark and doubts that they are right’. 
Despite the ambivalence of her claims, in positive terms, Shklar can be read as 
orientating an alternative conception of judgement through a balanced melange of 
attentiveness to our sense of injustice, the dangers of moralism, the need to avoid cruelty and 
attend to the voices of the victims, combined with a radical scepticism that embraces the 
uncertainty of our judgements. However, Shklar’s engagement with psychological literature 
threatens to undermine these insights. It turns judgement too easily into a breakdown from 
correct, possibly rational, judgement – a positive, but nonetheless substantive, account of 
right judgment which remains unspecified. Shklar’s thought thus appears to retain elements 
of the moralist account of political judgement. Her reflection on the ‘dark context’ of 
judgement, her adoption of psychological insights as starting point for the realist conception, 
seem to be undermined by a rather mysterious account of judgment which fuels her objection 
to standard, moralist models. 
Berlin’s sense of reality 
Berlin’s work is replete with allusions to the connection between moralism, or what he terms 
‘monism’ – the innocent belief in individual and societal perfection, under the aegis of a final 
harmony –, and judgement’s failure (Berlin 1976, 1998, 1999). For Berlin, totalitarian 
imagination and governmentality constitute radical, though pervasive and logical, 
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manifestations of moralism. They are fuelled by a blind acceptance of the truth of the 
‘philosophia perennis’:  
If a final solution is possible, no cost would be too high to obtain it: to make 
mankind just and harmonious for ever – what could be too high a price to pay? 
… What choice have we, who have the knowledge, but to be willing to 
sacrifice them all? (Berlin 1990, p.16).  
Moralism does not just entail the displacement of the messiness of politics at a philosophical 
level, by supplanting it with visions of a harmonious ‘world which is beyond our ken’ (Berlin 
1990, p.13, see also Berlin 2002). Nor does innocence, or the lack of political judgement, 
merely manifest themselves in a steadfast refusal to soil one’s purity when exposed to the 
grubbiness of politics. Such qualities possess a more active sense: they are often directly 
responsible for political disaster. The practical manifestation of the moralist quest for 
perfection – the dislodging of pluralism, diversity and conflict at a philosophical level – 
might entail a declaration of war against society en masse – the dislodging of pluralism, 
diversity and conflict at a practical level. Adherents of moralism, the ‘victims of forms of 
self-induced myopia’ (Berlin 1990, p.14), might seek to ‘bend … reality into conformity with 
their own wills’ (Hausheer 1979, pp. xix – xx) – to radically reorganise or purify society, by 
reducing the plurality of different individuals into ‘a Procrustean bed of some rigid dogma’ 
(Berlin 1998, p.77), and sacrificing ‘living human beings on the altars of abstractions’ (Berlin 
1990, p.16).  
Berlin’s positive project – the connection between reality and political judgement – is 
more explicitly developed in The Sense of Reality, in which he identifies an ordered reality, 
accessible in a methodical manner, divested from the classical notion of progression and 
perfection. Berlin’s account, heavily influenced by Vico’s theory of knowledge, distinguishes 
between two attributes or levels of reality: i) a surface reality, ‘an upper, public, illuminated, 
easily noticed, clearly describable, surface from which similarities are capable of being 
profitably abstracted and condensed into laws’; and ii) a lower level, a depth, which entails a 
‘path into less and less obvious yet more and more intimate and pervasive characteristics, too 
closely mixed with feelings and activities to be distinguished from them’ (Berlin 1997, p.20, 
see also Berlin 1976).  
Of particular interest is the lower level – with its ‘half-articulate habits, unexamined 
assumptions, and ways of thought, semi-instinctive reactions, models of life so deeply 
embedded as not to be consciously felt at all’ (Berlin 1997, p.20). This is inaccessible for any 
universal, scientific key or a priori judgement, which, once adopted and implemented in 
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practice, brings about numerous unaccounted, often unpalatable effects caused by the non-
conforming diversity and richness which comprise the depth of reality – effects which 
continuously break up the system and which cannot be displaced in a lasting manner. The 
judging political agent, like the judging historian, Berlin emphasised, should grasp what is 
specific and particular in a peculiar context, to understand the ‘unique pattern of experience’ 
of an event, ‘the unique combination of characteristics that constitute this particular situation 
– this and no other’ (Berlin 1998, p.45). This understanding cannot be reduced to scientific 
knowledge, as it requires ‘too much data that we are not even aware of how we take them in’ 
(Berlin 1997, p.23). Nor, by implication, is the capacity to judge politically based on ‘laws to 
be discovered, rules to be learnt’ (Berlin 1997, p.40), which is not to suggest that there are no 
facts or historical truths, as muddled as they may be – ergo Berlin’s (1997, pp.26 – 33) 
emphasis on the importance of having a sense of reality. To judge well requires a degree of 
improvisation and experience, informed by an appreciation of the complexity of reality, the 
risks of conflating ‘surface’ and ‘depth’ and of displacing the complexity, and richness of the 
lower levels comprising the latter. 
To judge well in a political sphere without substantive laws to guide one, is analogous 
to ‘deep-sea diving’, and is seen as a gift equal to that of creative imagination of artists, 
historians, and writers such as Pascal, Dostoyevsky, and Proust, amongst others, who have 
‘penetrated more deeply’ underlying patterns or unique events by delving beneath the surface 
reality with ‘great patience, industry, assiduity’ (Berlin 1997, p.45) – individuals who 
possess, what Berlin terms elsewhere following Vico, fantasia: an intuitive process of 
imaginative reconstruction; a ‘capacity for understanding people’s characters, knowledge of 
ways in which they are likely to react to one another, ability to enter into their motives, their 
principles, the movement of their thought and feelings’ (Berlin 1999, p.135). Political 
judgement thus becomes a ‘semi-intuitive skill – like the ability to read without simultaneous 
awareness of the rules of the language’ (Berlin 1997, p.45). 
As we elaborate later on, unlike Berlin’s conception of judgement – a conception which 
seems to rest on quasi-Aristotelian foundations and is intimately intertwined with a 
conception of prudence (Hanley 2004, p.330), Arendt found in Kant’s reflective judgement 
standards for this reading without awareness of the language rules (Schwartz 2015, p.5). 
Thus, while Berlin and Arendt share an emphasis on a sense or ‘ethic of reality’ (Owens 
2008, p.105) and the conviction that the capacity to judge without reliance on universal 
standards is integral to a polis characterized by pluralism, they differ significantly in the way 
in which they conceive of the process of judgement (Zerilli 2014). This recognition will 
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become clearer later on, as we explore the pluralist dimensions to Arendt’s judgement. For 
now, we wish to highlight that, Berlin’s account – by virtue of its anti-moralist nature – 
emphasises the connection between having a sense of reality and good judgement; or, in 
reverse, the affinities between displacing reality and bad judgement. For, ‘things are as they 
are, and we do well not to analyse away what makes them uniquely themselves … Men 
should never be blinded by the distorting spectacles of theory to what they know immediately 
to be true of themselves’ (Hausheer 1979, pp. xix - xx, p. xl, see also Berlin 1990, 1998). Yet, 
despite Berlin’s acknowledgement that the ‘distorting spectacles of [moralist] theory’ 
(Hausheer 1979, p. xl) might lead to ‘a cruel mockery of all that men hold dear’ (Berlin 1990, 
p.17), the absence of a more systematic account of political judgement renders the 
relationship between the sense of reality and good (or bad) judgement rather unclear. 
Berlin and Shklar provide concrete insights on a realist alternative conception of 
political judgment that are, however, only fragmentary and raise more questions than they 
answer. They provide extensive theories on the limitations of moralism (and its abstract, 
rationalist conception of judgement) and the dangers of displacing the political. They also 
explicitly highlight the need for a different realist form of political judgement, without 
elaborating fully on the alternative they have in mind. Thus, without denying their important 
insights, we conclude from this brief overview that they, as does political realism more 
generally, create a tension at the very heart of their anti-moralist project between the demands 
for attentiveness to the political and the neglect of one of its central features, political 
judgement. As we will show in the following sections using Arendtian scholarship, it is 
possible to combine a displacement critique with a positive exploration of political 
judgement, without denying its difficult context and the unique qualities of the political 
sphere or falling back into moralism guided by a priori moral principles. 
 
Arendt’s Realist Approach to Political Judgement 
At the heart of Arendt’s thought lies an anti-moralist emphasis on ‘the independence and 
dignity of the political realm’, and a recognition that ‘theory is no substitute for practice’ 
(Canovan 1983, p.287, p.298). Her work is framed by the need to recuperate a meaningful 
human existence in the context of totalitarianism and in light of a dissolution of stable 
standards for judgment through a break in tradition (Arendt 1958, 2006). In search of new 
ways to come to terms with the past and the atrocities of her time, Arendt (1998, p.9) noted 
the importance of the fact that ‘men, not man, live on the earth and inhabit the world’, and 
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dedicated her writing to conceiving a form of politics that is attentive to the potential of a 
pluralist, public sphere. 
To be sure, Arendt does not endorse the ‘conflict-fetishism’ which characterises much 
of realist thought: she focuses on the common world between equal citizens which has led 
some to identify a ‘sociologically naïve conception of the social’ (Azmanova 2012, p.132). 
The tendency to disassociate pluralism from deep conflict seems to suggest that her thought 
cannot account for the centrality of antagonism and hegemonic struggle to politics (Mouffe 
2007, p.4). However, her pluralist convictions also suggest that her account stands similarly 
opposed to the Rawlsian, liberal project – a point which is exemplified in Arendt’s rejection 
of Rousseau’s moralism. Rousseau’s conception of the general will, Arendt suggested, 
departs from an abstract standpoint: it seeks to articulate a substantive conception of the good 
shared by all citizens against all that is specific and particular to each individual and thereby 
reduces ‘a multitude’ into ‘a single person’ (Arendt 1963, p.72f.). What emerges from 
Arendt’s rejection of Rousseau’s moralism, Canovan surmises, is a criticism of high 
liberalism which echoes political realism – that, Rawls like Rousseau: 
does not take serious account of human plurality, of the fact that men and 
women are not clones of a single original plus or minus the effects of different 
social positions, but are instead rival centres of the world, each capable of 
thought, speech and action (Canovan 1983, pp.299 – 301). 
These commitments led her to reject central features of Kantianism – specifically Kant’s 
earlier Critiques – by virtue of their anti-political, world-less nature (Marshall 2010, p.368). 
Arendt’s critique of moralism is more encompassing in that she highlights the tendency 
of realists and moralists – through their shared concern with will-formation – to connect 
freedom with the faculty of willing, which introduces a notion of individual sovereignty as 
mastery into the political sphere and makes their normative projects potentially a- or even 
anti-political. Free will provides ‘essentially a passionate superiority toward a someone who 
must obey’ (Arendt 1978, p.161) and becomes entangled in a desire for command and rule 
over others (Arendt 2006, p.145). In response, Arendt completed a ‘virtual Copernican 
Revolution’ (Zerilli 2016, p.190) in locating freedom in political action and a non-sovereign 
form of judgement that draws its strength from enriching a community’s sense of reality. She 
only adopted Kant’s third Critique idiosyncratically to emphasise the possibility and need to 
build and protect the shared public sphere amidst an ‘activist democratic politics of contest, 
resistance, and amendment’ (Honig 1993, p.77, Lafer 1998).  
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Arendt’s insights on the dangers of moralist quests for the discovery and assertion of a 
single, comprehensive, universal account of the rational ethical truth unearths a second 
important point of convergence with realism: her acknowledgement of an insurmountable rift 
between a morally admirable and a virtuous political life – the tendency of philosophers to 
conflate moral and political virtue and approach the latter from an extra-terrestrial standpoint. 
Absolute morality, moral goodness, moral virtue and innocence (or, the self-deluded belief 
that one possesses these qualities), Arendt emphasised, are historically embodied in Plato’s 
Socratic moral injunctions, in the maxims of Christianity, in Robespierre’s ‘terror of virtue’ – 
the public manifestation of Rousseau’s moralism – and, in the characters of Prince Myshkin 
and Billy Budd from Dostoevsky’s The Idiot and Melville’s Billy Budd respectively (Arendt 
1963, p.82). These examples reveal the limits of perfectibility and the tragic recognition that 
the qualities one might hope to observe in a morally admirable life are antagonistic to and 
displace worldliness and politics– that, they are dangerous to the public space which diverse 
humans share (Arendt 1998, 2006). 
To recap, Arendt’s thought seems to depart from realism through its stronger focus on 
the possibility of consensus, although she lacks any interest in prescribing criteria for 
adjudicating between world-views, but similarly holds that moralism is likely to lead to an 
intolerable world (Terada 2008, p.103). To be sure, Arendt’s distinctions of violence and 
power, of the private and the public, and of the social and the political, her regulative 
attempts to protect various spheres from each other, raises the question of whether she 
undermines the unique qualities of politics she identifies (Honig 1993, p.118ff.). Nonetheless, 
Arendt’s work echoes and anticipates a set of core realist concerns: it emphasises that the 
‘unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality – whatever it may be’ (Arendt 
1958, p. viii) serves as a foundation for good politics. It challenges the prioritization of ‘ethics 
over politics’ and advances this by an appeal to an ‘ethic of reality’ which is intertwined with 
a particular community’s plural perception of appearance; for, despite the resilience of factual 
truths, the shared sense of reality is thought as the only stable means of accounting for reality 
(Arendt 1998, p.199, Owens 2008). Judgement is key to this ‘ethic of reality’; thus, instead of 
exploring the various nuances of Arendt’s thought, and realist or moralist positions further, it 
is to Arendtian insights on this human capacity that we now turn. 
Arendt’s reflective judgement 
Though unfinished, Arendt’s work serves as a central point of reference and contention 
in the contemporary scholarship on the elusive phenomenon of political judgement (see 
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Beiner 1983, Benhabib 1988, Zerilli 2016). Arendt’s account of judgement8 has been subject 
to radically different interpretations and caught between central polarisations of political 
thought in the late 20th and early 21st century. Following debates on its modern and 
postmodern affinities, Canovan (1992) and Bernstein (1996) helped clarify how Arendt’s 
thought is fuelled by a concern for the political catastrophes of her time. This interpretation 
connects with our earlier suggestion that, at the core of Arendt’s account of political 
judgement lie a set of realist themes: an emphasis on an ‘ethic of reality’, the need to face and 
come to terms with 20th century’s dark times through political practices, and a critique of the 
prioritisation of applied ethics over politics, which displaces the need to engage with the 
implications of pluralism. Throughout her work, Arendt captured the devastating effect of 
this displacement on judgement, and the dangers of a breakdown in political judgement for 
human’s capacity to live meaningfully together. 
We cannot delve at great length into the much rehearsed tensions and innovations of 
Arendt’s writing on judgement, especially her (1982) idiosyncratic reading of Kant’s third 
Critique. In brief terms, Arendt drew on his account of aesthetic judgement in light of the 
challenges posed by a break in tradition in modernity – the separation of tradition, religion, 
and authority – which required judging particulars ‘without a banister’ (Arendt 1979, p.336), 
without sufficient guidance by universals. To that end, she singled out reflective judgement 
and its reliance, in her reading, on a strong public sphere as the suitable response to this 
modern problem: for, reflective judgement does not rely on universal principles and must, 
instead, build on a combination of community sense, disinterestedness, representative 
thought, and the pro- and retrospective dimension to judgement. Reflective judgement is thus 
political in a procedural rather than substantive sense (cf. Zerilli 2016, p.8). 
Given that Arendt never wrote her final book on judgement and the discussion of her 
theory largely draws on her lectures on Kant, what might we gain from Arendt’s thought that 
adds to the insights by Shklar and Berlin on a realist alternative conception of political 
judgement? We argue that her account moves realist political thought on judgement forward 
in two important ways. Firstly, Arendt identified in totalitarianism, mass society, and 
philosophy a tendency to isolate people from their common world, causing the ‘bankruptcy of 
common sense in the modern world’ (Arendt 1994, p.314) as a guide for coming to terms 
with reality. The loss of a ‘common and factual reality’ became ‘a political problem of the 
first order’ (Arendt 2006, p.232). In response, she formulated a community sense that is 
simultaneously the product and pre-condition of an ongoing, open-ended practice of action 
and judgement aimed at strengthening and expanding a sense of reality. Secondly, Arendt 
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criticised the thirst for an Archimedean standpoint and replaced the ‘objectivity’ of a 
detached observer with the judgement of a plurality of spectators. Arendt’s spectator remains 
closely connected to political action and brings to the political sphere a capacity for 
‘representative thinking’ (Arendt 2006, p.237) that is open for contestation and renegotiation. 
Political judgement emerges out of a back and forth between actors and spectators that 
enables judgement to gain a form of ‘situated impartiality’ (Disch 1993, p.666). 
We turn first to common sense.9 Arendt’s engagement with common sense was 
informed by the capacity of totalitarianism and mass society to isolate people from their 
common world (Arendt 1958: 475, 1998: 248ff., 2006: 89f.). In an effort to rekindle that 
relationship, she formulated two conceptions of common sense that share a reliance on the 
commonality of reality. Firstly, common sense, which refers to the worldly context of 
perception and ‘a feeling of realness’ (Arendt 1978, p.51, 2006, p.218). The ‘sixth sense’ 
reveals the communality of an object to different senses and different people, thus opening up 
the ‘it-seems-to-me’ to public contestation (Arendt 1978, p.50). Secondly, community sense, 
which emerges out of human beings’ need to refer to, and together make sense of, a world in 
common – to ‘“woo” or “court” the agreement of everyone else’ as one ‘can never compel 
anyone to agree with one’s judgments’ (Arendt 1982, p.72). It entails a feeling of sharing a 
world and its ethico-political implications. Community sense is constitutive of judgement as 
judgement always relies on limited, imperfect information and requires continuous 
confirmation and potential acknowledgement of one’s perspective by other community 
members. 
Arendt provided us with three important qualifications. Firstly, her understanding of 
community sense is concerned with how to bring together different perspectives on a shared 
object, rather than reducing difference to an overlapping consensus. Although Arendt referred 
repeatedly to the issue of validity in relation to Kant’s aesthetic judgement, hers is not 
primarily an ‘epistemological problem’ (Zerilli 2005, p.166), how to ensure that judgements 
are reasonable and valid and not merely subjective, but the problem of the new – how to 
‘judge without the set of customary rules which is morality’ (Arendt 1994, p.321) so that 
humans can ‘come to terms with what irrevocably happened’ and be ‘reconciled with what 
unavoidably exists’ (Arendt 1994, p.322) in a way that understands new issues and 
perspectives ‘as a beginning’ (Arendt 1994, p.319). For this reason, community sense must 
be understood as a process that while context-dependent is also malleable and a creative force 
that through persuasion and imagination gains purchase on new appearances without falling 
back on determinate judgements. Secondly, community sense is a product of concrete 
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practices of judgement and action with specific members of a community. It is tied to a 
community of political spectators and actors who engage with a political problem, those ‘in 
whose place the judging person has put himself for his considerations’ (Arendt 2006, p.221) 
and the community of peers to whom one refers in making one’s judgement and to whom ‘the 
objects of judgment appear’ (Arendt 2006, p.221). Thirdly, the community sense that a 
person refers to is coded by – but never limited to – the past experiences and interactions with 
other people’s perspectives. The quality of judgement, Arendt (2006, p.226) therefore 
concluded, is dependent on our capacity to choose one’s ‘company among men, among 
things, among thoughts, in the present as well as in the past’. 
Arendt’s project of strengthening a community sense was inevitably faced with two 
significant hurdles. Firstly, how can political judgement restore a shared framework of 
reference from which to engage with reality, if judgement depends on a community sense to 
function in the first place? Secondly, how can political practices of persuasion produce a 
suitable sense of community from which to judge political problems, if politics is faced by 
the kind of systematic failure of community sense and judgement (and the denial of that 
failure) that Arendt experienced during Nazi Germany? For a response to these questions, 
Arendt re-formulated the actor-spectator binary at the heart of judgement, by reading a thick 
notion of plurality into Kant’s aesthetic judgement and in particular the concept of enlarged 
mentality. 
Arendt in her later writing was concerned with the negative link between thought and 
judgement through a form of thoughtfulness associated with the Platonic philosopher, or 
thoughtlessness, a feature of Arendt’s Eichmann (Arendt 1978, Schiff 2012). Both, in 
different ways, lead to a devastating lack of a moral or political compass – that is community 
sense – and, consequently to political disaster. In response, Arendt sought to re-embed the 
detached spectator, familiar from philosophy and logical positivism, in political practices, 
without losing sight of the potential of spectatorship to gain critical purchase on ongoing 
events through critical distance and enlargement of one’s mind. The spectator ‘does not leave 
the world of appearances but retires from active involvement in it to a privileged position in 
order to contemplate the whole’ (Arendt 1978, p.94, cf. 1982, p.65). Arendt emphasised that 
politics always needs both agents that act and appear and spectators that, in relation to each 
other, give action meaning and relevance: ‘the very novelty of the actor’ depends on ‘making 
himself understood by those who are not’ acting (Arendt 1982, p.63). She also highlighted 
that everybody takes up the positions of a spectator or an actor from time to time. Arendt’s 
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later emphasis on the spectator thus complements and completes her focus on the actor in the 
Human Condition (Arendt 1998, p.199, 1982, p.63). 
Arendt pointed her readers towards how the spectator’s judgement might be able to 
connect critical distance and political action and rely on plurality to make political judgments. 
She re-interpreted Kant’s disinterestedness, the capacity to move beyond the immediate effect 
of an object on a person, and enlarged mentality, as a practice of representative thinking that 
entails the possibility to train ‘one’s imagination to go visiting’ (Arendt 1982, p.43). This 
form of critical thinking, which sits well with Berlin’s notion of fantasia and imagination, 
allows humans to imagine alternative perspectives on an issue without adopting these and 
without losing sight of the ‘it seems to me’. This ‘process of representation does not blindly 
adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world 
from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, […] but of being and 
thinking in my own identity where actually I am not’; the ‘better I can imagine how I would 
feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative 
thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion’ (Arendt 2006, p.237). 
Disinterestedness and representative thought are constitutive of political judgement; in their 
absence, sharing a meaningful world would be impossible as they ensure both the distance 
and connection between people.10 
We conclude that although Arendt remained at odds with strands of realist political 
thought, because of her rejection of a focus on sovereignty, domination, and conflict, the two 
contributions on common sense and the actor-spectator binary help embed judgement firmly 
in the murky context of politics. The contributions also reveal how political realists can 
enrich their critique of displacement tendencies through an alternative conception of political 
judgement that foregrounds a situated form of impartiality in the place of transcendental 
standards. Alongside Berlin and Shklar, Arendt identified the urgent challenge of establishing 
a strong sense of reality, but draws our attention to the unique potential for judgement found 
in the political practices that strengthen human plurality. Thus understood, Arendt adds to the 
conceptualisation of political judgement, by formulating judgement as situated without 
remaining fully dependent on cultural standards, and transcendent without turning to a priori 
principles that displace politics and political judgement, and without relying entirely on the 
unique qualities of singular ‘good’ judges. Arendt’s common sense, representative thought, 
and the interrelation between actor and spectator capture an important positive tendency 
which could serve as the starting point for a more comprehensive realist account of politics 
and of judgement; that, in a political sphere riven by conflict and disagreement, they offer the 
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foundation of stable, good, and to some extent valid politics – a politics directed at enabling a 
complex, comprehensive understanding of reality, without reliance on frozen moral 
principles. 
 
 
Arendtian Political Judgement: From Exemplarity to Radical Imagination 
We now wish to move beyond scholars that elaborated the dangers of moralism to judgement 
in the context of 20th century’s totalitarianism towards current debates on Arendt’s theory of 
political judgement. In recent years, her account has been extended in reaction to the burdens 
of judgement identified by Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls at the end of the 20th century 
(see Azmanova 2012, Ferrara 1999, 2008, Zerilli 2016). In dialogue with this diverse 
literature, we wish to highlight two directions in which political realists could extend Arendt 
to strengthen their conception of political judgement even further: i) by introducing a concern 
with social conditioning and power into the practice of judgement and ii) by identifying 
further ways to protect and build a distinctly political sphere. Azmanova and Zerilli are 
singled out as each capturing one of the dimensions and we provide a brief sketch of their 
arguments. 
In discussing the realist themes in Arendt’s thought, we noted the divide along the 
axis conflict-consensus between political realist concerns with questions of power struggle, 
legitimacy, and interests, and Arendt’s emphasis on recuperating a political sphere that is 
irreducible to means-ends thinking. Azmanova (2012), offers a middle ground between 
realism and moralism, and possibly a way to reconcile Arendt with political realists’ 
particular concern with power. She seeks to develop a critical theory of judgement as public 
reason that is freed from Habermas’ transcendental turn towards Kantian moral universalism 
and moves beyond Arendt’s concern with the meaningfulness of the particular. Neither is 
sufficiently equipped to account for the encoding of structurally produced injustice into the 
phonetic – experience-based – structure of public reason. The pre-discursive structuring of 
judgement through a plurality of spectators that Arendt identified is embedded in power 
asymmetries and social injustice that shape the web of shared notions regarding what is 
relevant and open to significant disagreement. To be both politically salient and normatively 
critical, a theory of political judgement thus needs to disclose this pre-structuring, or 
patterning of judgement, i.e. the matrix of relevance (Azmanova 2012, p.157). In doing so, 
Azmanova claims, one might be better able to maintain the critical potential of reflective 
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judgement to evaluate social injustice, without neglecting the codes of social (re-)production 
and social origins of identity stratification inscribed in its formulation. 
This shift of focus – from a quest for harmony and agreement on justice to feelings of 
injustice – seems innately valuable for political realism and sits neatly with Shklar’s and 
Berlin’s thought. However, Azmanova does not resolve the problems of neo-Kantian 
theorising on judgement altogether. As Mihaela Mihai (2014) notes, Azmanova holds on to a 
belief that the matrix of relevance is sufficiently flexible and unstable to be transformed 
through the power of discursive confrontation. Reified patterns of signification and 
articulation, Azmanova argues, can be challenged by the engagement with others’ truth 
assertions, which, even if unacknowledged, leads to the de-stabilisation of the reference 
points and the formulation of new links (Azmanova 2012, p.215f.). This reveals once more a 
tendency towards displacing the political, and it is at this point that political realists should 
take up the conceptual space opened up by Azmanova for theorising realist political 
judgement and its relationship to power, interests, and legitimacy. At the level of the polis, 
realists may seek to articulate how issues of injustice, violence, and power are coded into 
judgement and require our attention. At the level of the individual, a realist theory of political 
judgement may consider the way political judgement warrants a sustained engagement with 
the conflicts and choices facing those engaged in a political life to avoid the displacement of 
judgement in politics. 
Alongside this first dimension, a political realist conception of judgement should 
explain what a ‘politics first’ – as opposed to ‘ethics first’/applied ethics – approach entails. 
A focus on a matrix of relevance concerned with systemic injustice and power goes some 
way towards answering this question. But it does not explain the depth to displacement 
critique offered by both Arendt and political realism that seems to suggest a radically 
different conception of politics. To that end, we consider one of the most prominent 
judgement scholars, Zerilli (2005, 2012, 2016). Democratic theorists, Zerilli argues, should 
turn to the difficult task of protecting politics, or the common world, which is threatened by a 
moralist desire to turn to the ‘true world’. The problem of applied ethics for politics is not 
only the abstraction from how humans really are, as realists would have it, but that ideal 
theory ‘starts with what Arendt called “man” rather than “the world” (Zerilli 2016, p.278). A 
truly political response to these failures must therefore not only highlight the importance of 
attending to the real conditions of politics, but seek to re-build the world in common, which 
requires us ‘to recognise common objects as candidates for judgement, objects on which our 
considered opinions may very well diverge’ (Zerilli 2016, p.267). 
20 
Judgement, as a political process, is first of all a ‘practice through which citizens can 
enlarge their sense of what belongs in the common world’ (Zerilli 2016, p.279). One of the 
key activities to facilitate this process of generating a distinctly political sphere is 
imagination. Arendt and Berlin share this concern with imagination, but Zerilli turns it into a 
particularly important political capacity –an ability to open up the public sphere to ‘values 
that have not yet found expression in the sense of a determinate concept’ (Zerilli 2005, 
p.171). By this she describes how humans affirm freedom by holding on to an imaginative 
extension of a concept beyond its ordinary uses in cognitive judgement. The aim is to ‘gain 
critical purchase on what each takes for granted’ (Zerilli 2012, p.19) and to acknowledge the 
political, transformative force of ‘a form of speaking and judging that unsettles how we 
understand those principles and the apparent coherence of the “we” that denies its contingent 
and exclusionary character’ (Zerilli 2012, p.19). Thus, whether realists wish to follow 
Zerilli’s particular understanding of politics or not, her democratic theory of judgement sheds 
new light on ways in which the realist political sphere could be filled up. She shows how we 
can disentangle the particularly political character of human activities as part of a realist 
theory of political judgement that replaces the displacement strategies found in various forms 
of moralism. 
 
Conclusion – Towards a Realist Account of Political Judgement  
Sunnil Khilnani (2009) captures an important point about political judgement: it is made 
under complex circumstances and can have disastrous effects. It is this messy context and 
direct impact of our choices upon a polis that realists are concerned with; and, it is precisely 
for these reasons why they highlight the importance of taking real judgements seriously. Our 
analysis of Berlin and Shklar showed how their important contributions on this capacity 
remain underdeveloped. Berlin considers the connection between a multi-layered deep reality 
and judgements but leaves the capacity semi-intuitive and its standards and procedure 
mysterious. Shklar accounts for a dark and complex world and introduces psychological 
evidence but rejects the inherent quality of human’s judgement in light of what might seem a 
‘correct’ judgement ideal. Therefore, although these theorists reject moralism, by virtue of its 
tendency to displace politics, and emphasise the problem real judgements face, they seem 
unable to capture its potential or actual exercise. They succumb to an important problem for 
political realism: its proponents seem unable to move beyond a critical stance to moralism 
and offer a more affirmative realist alternative. 
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Despite significant differences between the two, we argued that Arendt’s thought – by 
virtue of its critique of moralism, her ethic of reality, and the belief in the importance of real 
political judgement – dovetails with contemporary realism. Realists may incorporate her 
insights on community sense, representative thought, and the actor-spectator dichotomy. A 
realist conception of political judgement could, however, also say more along two extensions 
in judgement scholarship: how judgements can focus on the encoding of injustice and 
violence into the judging practice, put forward through Azmanova’s matrix of relevance, and 
the ways in which different political capacities can help judgement contribute to engendering 
a distinctly political sphere, visible in Linda Zerilli’s democratic theory of judgement. To be 
sure, developing a realist account of political judgment by drawing on Arendt’s work is 
merely a starting point. Political realism requires a continuous engagement with the 
complexities of political judgement. 
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Notes
 
1 Whilst realist sources of anti-moralism are manifold, exploring these is beyond the 
paper’s scope. We focus on its more contemporary proponents who are understood as 
resisting ‘the authority of moral philosophy in the discipline of politics’ (Philp 2012, 
p.3). 
2 That contemporary realism remains largely negative in nature, is a well-worn 
concession made by realists. As Andy Sabl and Rahul Sagar (2017, p. 270) write: 
‘realists spent more time explaining what was wrong with “ideal theory” than they 
spent doing “realist theory”’. See also Galston (2010), Horton (2010), Hall (2015). 
3 See, however, Nardin (2017). 
4 The “realism” discussed here follows more canonical conceptualisations of that term 
which distinguish between realism in political theory and realism in international 
relations (Sleat 2011, Horton 2017) and/or which are critical of the latter. Yet, we do 
not wish to suggest that these two traditions are incompatible in toto. For an attempt to 
bridge the gulf between these two traditions, see Scheuerman (2013).  
5 Though realists are not dismissive of these thinkers, there exists considerable 
discrepancy between the amount of ink spilled on Williams’s and Geuss’s thought vis-
à-vis Shklar’s, and Berlin’s. 
6 This dovetails with Edward Hall’s (2015, p.284) observation that whilst commentators 
construe realism as, a ‘negative creed which fails to offer a positive, alternative way of 
thinking normatively about politics’, this ‘focus has obscured the more constructive 
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elements of realist political thinking’. The possible objection that there can never be 
such a comprehensive theory of political judgement – an objection which seemingly 
conceives of judgement as the capacity of evaluation without set standards – only 
reproduces a problematic dichotomy between purely practical intuitive processes and 
intellectualist formalism, reflective and determinate judgement. 
7 See also Shklar’s Legalism which develops this challenge against legalism - an 
ideology obsessed with obedience to allegedly universal, monolithic rules which 
erroneously seek to subdue politics. Legalism, Shklar (1964, p. 75) maintains ‘hides the 
facts of moral life in the interests of false comfort’. At best, by virtue of its belief in 
certain rules on which rational individuals can agree and its tendency to ‘seal off’ law 
‘from the world of conflict’, ‘legalism, in practice, can make people uncompromising’ 
and ignore ‘those who feel offended or injured’ by a decision which appears ‘”unjust” 
because it does not conform to their system of moral rules’ (Shklar 1964, pp.104 -107). 
At worst, it might spell disaster: ‘it ought to be remembered that, in any society where 
moral diversity exists, agreement-as-an-end-in-itself can only be achieved by 
totalitarian methods’ (Shklar 1964, p.100). 
8 Judgement, for Arendt (1978, p.193), is ‘the ability to say “this is wrong”, “this is 
beautiful,” and so on’, and the ‘by-product of the liberating effect of thinking, [which] 
realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the world of appearances, where I am never 
alone and always too busy to think’. 
9 There exist numerous different interpretations of Arendt’s common or community 
sense. Recent commentators fruitfully move beyond worries about the Kantian legacy 
to her account of judgement, to identify in Arendt a notion of common sense tied to an 
open-ended, circulatory practice of action and judgement that together give meaning to 
events and build a world in common (Borren 2013, Schwartz 2015). 
10 This need not entail that all judgements are only adequate if they follow a process of 
disinterestedness and enlarged mentality. Further, the adequacy of these processes 
depends on the context and person, as quick judgements often tend to be more accurate 
and successful. However, as Arendt sought to show using Eichmann, the failure to 
think representatively, to engage politically the perspectives of other people and to 
build a common world, can have devastating consequences for politics and humanity. 
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